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THE RATIONALE OF RATIONALITY
Jeroen Weesie, Chris Snijders, and Vincent Buskens
ABSTRACT
Our research starts from the assumption that actors use a single deci-
sion theory to guide them on how to behave in all possible one-shot
two-person encounters. To address which decision theories perform
well, we let 17 theories compete in a large number of randomly
selected symmetric 2 × 2 games. It turns out that the decision theory
that optimizes its own payoff under the assumption that the other actor
behaves randomly wins by a small margin. Second, we study the ‘evo-
lution of rationality.’ In a quasi-biological setup where more successful
strategies generate more offspring, the decision theory that always
plays the behavior that belongs to the risk-dominant Nash equilibrium
emerges as the long-term survivor from an initially mixed pool of deci-
sion theories. We also confront the decision theories with human exper-
imental data. The decision theory that always aims for the highest
possible payoff for itself performs best against humans.
KEYWORDS • decision theories • evolution • one-shot encounters
• rationality
1 Introduction
This article extends the discussion on whether rational behavior can be
sustained or emerges as an evolutionary process from a situation in which
initially most of the actors are not rational in the game-theoretic sense
(e.g. see Güth and Kliemt 1998 on the evolution of rational behavior in
trust situations). This question is also one of the main questions that is
asked in the field of evolutionary economics. However, evolutionary eco-
nomics uses evolutionary arguments more as equilibrium selection tools
for situations with multiple equilibria. For example, the question is
addressed on which equilibrium actors coordinate in a coordination game
given that they start with a random decision and that behavior leading to
a favorable outcome becomes more likely (e.g. Young 1993). Similarly,
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there are many studies on the evolution of cooperation in repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemmas or collective good problems (see Axelrod 1984;
Macy and Flache 1995; Macy 1997).
An important limitation of the studies mentioned above is that they
focus on just one type of interaction in which actors are involved repeat-
edly. Either a certain type of behavior in this specific game is reinforced
because it provides higher benefits or certain preferences become more
abundant in a society because these preferences are related to better out-
comes. In one-shot encounters, behavior is just a specific choice in an
interaction, while behavior in repeated interactions may include more
complicated strategies that are related to experiences in the past (e.g.
Tit-for-Tat in Axelrod 1984). This implies that these studies cannot
explain the emergence of specific rationality principles that actors might
use in a variety of interactions.
Heckathorn (1996) argued that collective good problems are related to a
whole range of types of two-person games including Prisoner’s Dilemmas,
Chicken Games, andAssurance Games. We agree that two-person interac-
tions are likely to take various forms in real-life. In addition, we argue that
it is likely that decision principles will survive in an evolutionary context
that do not just do well in one type of interaction, but that prevail when con-
fronted with a range of different interactions. Also, Bednar and Page
(2007) study emergence of strategies in situations where actors play dif-
ferent games. Their approach is complementary to ours. Although they use
a more limited set of games (different versions of coordination games),
they let their actors play repeatedly with actors in their local neighborhood.
We use more different games but we restrict ourselves by letting people
play with strangers all the time.
Formal decision theory has produced a long series of proposals for the-
ories of rational behavior in situations of interdependent choice. Both
among decision theory scholars and among applied scholars from a whole
range of social sciences, there does not seem to be agreement with respect
to the central question of what constitutes ‘truly’ rational behavior in situ-
ations of interdependent choice. In this article, we address this question by
evaluating which decision theory survives in a world in which players can
use different decision theories. It will not be possible to analyze this
abstract and complicated problem in full generality. One important reason
is that decision theories, especially those based on Nash equilibrium, are
incomplete since many games have multiple equilibria. Harsanyi and
Selten’s (1988) theory of equilibrium selection has, as far as we know, not
been confronted with a competing theory of a similar scope. Especially for
many infinitely repeated games, the equilibrium selection problem is still
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far from solved. Therefore, we decided for now to consider a restrictive set
of games for which equilibrium selection is not problematic and for which
multiple equilibrium selection theories have been proposed: one-shot sym-
metric 2 × 2 games with complete information.
An additional reason for taking this approach is that for these rela-
tively simple games it is conceivable that people use a single decision
theory across these games. Or, perhaps more adequately, it is conceiv-
able that evolution will eventually take care of equipping people with a
single decision theory for these situations. Therefore, the main question
we analyze is: what kind of general decision theory is most successful
in a world consisting entirely of one-shot symmetric 2 × 2 games. We
will consider a range of decision theories that include one that chooses
randomly one of the options in the 2 × 2 games, decision theories that
play best replies assuming that the other player plays in a probabilistic
way, as well as decision theories that play best replies assuming their
opponents also try to play best replies. The last category of theories
comprises the rational strategies in the game-theoretic sense.
Even for symmetric 2 × 2 games, a strictly formal analysis of the inter-
actions between decision theories and the selection of an ‘optimal’ deci-
sion theory is a non-trivial matter analytically. For example, integration
over the distribution of games might be straightforward for very simple
distributions of payoffs such as the uniform distribution. However,
assuming other distributions this becomes more complicated. Therefore,
we apply Monte Carlo integration to compute expected values over the
assumed distribution of games.
We proceed as follows. First, we fix a population of decision theories.
Then we let these decision theories play a large number of one-shot
symmetric 2 × 2 games against each other. We compare the average pay-
off that each decision theory receives in the encounters with all the other
theories. This resembles the round robin tournament of Axelrod (1984).
This analysis results in a ranking of strategies with respect to how well
they perform in this population of strategies. We will see that relatively
simple and optimistic strategies are performing quite well under these
conditions, just like strategies that are based on Nash equilibrium.
Subsequently, we add an evolutionary logic to this process: strategies
that are doing well tend to become more frequent, while strategies that
are doing badly tend to go extinct. The result of this is that the strategies
that did not perform very well in the first analysis gradually disappear.
Then, the strategies that performed best against the strategies that have
disappeared are disappearing – in an evolutionary setting, lasting suc-
cess should be in encounters with other successful strategies, not against
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unsuccessful ones. As it turns out, the Nash-based decision theories tend
to survive this evolutionary process. Although we realize that this exer-
cise is just a first step in a project on the evolution of decision rules in a
dynamic environment, we still wanted to add an empirical twist to this
article. Therefore, we end with a short investigation into how the artifi-
cial strategies perform against human subjects who were asked to make
decisions in several 2 × 2 games. Here, it turns out that human subjects
themselves obtain low average payoffs. Moreover, we find that strategies
that did not perform very well in the tournament and in the evolutionary
process are performing best against human beings. We outline the impli-
cations of these findings in the conclusion and discussion.
2 A Set of Decision Theories
Figure 1 shows a symmetric 2 × 2 game. Because we only consider deci-
sion theories that do not depend on the representation of the game, we
can assume without loss of generality that a > d in Figure 1.
We also assume that there are no ties in the payoffs. This implies there
are 12 different possible payoff orderings, representing 12 different types
of games (see Table 1). There are six payoff orderings in which both play-
ers have a dominant strategy (games 1, 3, 4, 8, 10, and 11). These games
have a unique Nash equilibrium. Three of these six games (games 1, 3,
and 4) have an equilibrium in which both players receive the maximal
payoff in equilibrium. Two of the games (games 10 and 11) leave the play-
ers with the second highest payoff, and in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
(game 8) the equilibrium provides the players with the second lowest out-
come. There are three types of games that have three symmetric equilib-
ria (games 2, 5, and 6): one in which both receive a, one in which both get
d, and one mixed equilibrium. The last three types (games 7, 9, and 12)
also have three equilibria but two of these are asymmetric (one player gets
b while the other gets c), whereas the third equilibrium is a symmetric




X a, a c, b
Y b, c d, d
Figure 1. Notation for symmetric 2 × 2 games
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mixed equilibrium. Table 1 gives an overview in lexicographic ordering of
the different games and their properties.
Table 2 briefly describes 17 decision theories that each generates
unique predictions for behavior in symmetric 2 × 2 games. The decision
theories are allowed to make randomized decisions. Most of these theo-
ries can be adequately defined by the assumption they make about the
way in which the focal player (Ego) forms expectations about the behav-
ior of Alter, supplemented with the assumption that players choose opti-
mally given their expectations. In the first and simplest class of decision
theories, we find theories where the expectation of the behavior of Alter
is independent of the payoffs of Alter. For instance, the Principle of
Insufficient Reason (PIR) assumes that both Alter’s choices are equally
likely, while MaxiMin-pure (MMPURE) supposes that Alter will try to
minimize the payoffs of Ego (‘people are out to get me’, see Luce and
Raiffa 1957: 284–286 for a historical account starting with Jakob
Bernoulli). This implies that given what Ego plays, Ego assumes that
Alter will play the strategy that corresponds with Ego’s worst payoff.
MMPURE plays the best move in pure strategies against this expectation.
MAXIMAX expects that Alter will try to maximize the payoffs of Ego.We
can conceive of these strategies as elements of a larger set of strategies
H(α), where the ‘H’ stems from ‘Hurwicz’. H(α) calculates the expected
value of choosing X under the assumption that the opponent will choose
the move that is best for Ego with probability α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) and the other
move with probability 1 − α. Similarly, an H(α) player calculates the
expected value of choosing Y. He then chooses the move (X or Y) with
WEESIE ET AL.: THE RATIONALE OF RATIONALITY 253
Table 1. Possible payoff orderings of symmetric 2 × 2 games
Order of payoffs Equilibria (symmetric) Name
1 a > b > c > d 1 (1) Unique Nash (a, a)
2 a > b > d > c 3 (3) Assurance game
3 a > c > b > d 1 (1) Unique Nash (a, a)
4 a > c > d > b 1 (1) Unique Nash (a, a)
5 a > d > b > c 3 (3) Assurance-like game
6 a > d > c > b 3 (3) Assurance-like game
7 b > a > c > d 3 (1) Chicken game
8 b > a > d > c 1 (1) Prisoner’s Dilemma
9 b > c > a > d 3 (1) Chicken-like game
10 c > a > b > d 1 (1) Unique Nash (a, a)
11 c > a > d > b 1 (1) Unique Nash (a, a)
12 c > b > a > d 3 (1) Chicken-like game
(Battle of the sexes)
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the highest expected value. The α parameter can be understood as an
‘optimism index’ (Luce and Raiffa 1957: 282–284): the larger α is, the
more positive the expectations about the behavior of Alter. PIR equals
H(0.5), MMPURE equals H(0), and MAXIMAX equals H(1). We also
included H(0.25) and H(0.75).
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Table 2. Four classes of decision theories for
one-shot symmetric 2 × 2 games
1. Hurwicz: optimal behavior against simple expectations about Alter (5 strategies)
H(α) Hurwicz calculates the expected value of choosing X under the assumption
that Alter will choose the move that is best for Hurwicz with probability
α (0  α  1) and the other move with probability 1 − α. Similarly,
Hurwicz calculates the expected value of choosing Y. Hurwicz then
chooses the move (X or Y) with the highest expected value. We include
H(0.25) and H(0.75) in addition to the following three special cases.
MMPURE MaxiMin-pure is equivalent to H(0). It assumes that, no matter what, Alter
will play the move that minimizes the Ego’s payoff. MMPURE is a best
reply in pure strategies given the ‘pessimistic’ expectation that the worst
will always happen.
PIR Principle of Insufficient Reason is equivalent to H(0.5). It chooses the move
that is optimal given the assumption that Alter will play X and Y with equal
probability. PIR is the best reply against RANDOM.
MAXIMAX is equivalent to H(1). It plays the best reply under the optimistic assumption
that Alter will always choose the move that maximizes Ego’s payoff.
2. Best replies against the Hurwicz strategies (5 strategies)
BH(α) assumes that Alter plays H(α), and plays the best reply against it. We
include BH(0.25) and BH(0.75).
BMMPURE assumes that Alter plays MMPURE, and plays the best reply against it.
BPIR assumes that Alter plays PIR, and plays the best reply against it.
BMAXIMAX assumes that Alter plays MAXIMAX, and plays the best reply against it.
3. Strategies using (refinements of) Nash equilibrium (2 strategies)
PAYOFF selects the symmetric Nash equilibrium with the highest equilibrium payoff.
RISK selects the risk-dominant symmetric Nash equilibrium.
4. Miscellaneous other strategies (5 strategies)
MMMIXED MaxiMin-Mixed plays the (possibly mixed) equilibrium strategy for the
game where the payoffs for Alter are replaced by minus the payoffs of Ego.
SAVAGE plays the (possibly mixed) equilibrium strategy for the game where the
payoffs Rij for Ego are defined as Rij = Mij − maxh Mhj, and the payoffs for
Alter equal to minus the payoffs of Ego.
PARETO assumes that both Ego and Alter play (X, Y) with probability (p, 1 − p), and
then chooses the value of p (0 < p < 1) that maximizes the expected payoff.
NATURAL plays a dominant strategy if available. Otherwise it will play a Pareto-
efficient equilibrium in pure strategies if it exists. If that does not exist, it
applies the MMPURE criterion.
RANDOM plays X and Y with equal probability (0.5).
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The second class of decision theories consists of the best replies against
the five aforementioned H(α) strategies. The analysis inAppendixA shows
that we need not worry about an infinite cycle of ‘best replies against best
replies against best replies,’ because in fact the best replies against the best
replies against the H(α) strategies, are the H(α) strategies themselves. Note
that if we were to find out that someone plays according to PIR, this gives
us no clue as to how ‘deep’ this person is actually thinking. Ego might be
choosing PIR because he has no clue what Alter will do, or Ego might be
playing a best reply against a best reply to PIR (which is PIR as well).
The third class of decision theories consists of refinements of the
Nash equilibrium concept.We chose two relatively standard refinements
that prescribe which equilibrium should be played if there are more.
They differ only in which equilibrium is selected in case a game has
more than one symmetric equilibrium. Payoff dominance (PAYOFF) as
well as risk dominance (RISK) first calculates the Nash equilibria. When
there is only one symmetric equilibrium (mixed or pure) then this equi-
librium is played. When there are three (two is not possible), PAYOFF
chooses the one that is payoff dominant (Harsanyi and Selten 1988:
80–82), while RISK chooses the one that is risk dominant, i.e., RISK plays
the same as PIR in these cases, namely a best reply against the assump-
tion that the other actor plays both options with equal probability (see
Harsanyi and Selten 1988: 86–88; Güth 1992: 191–205).
The fourth and last class consists of decision theories not easily clas-
sified elsewhere. Maximin-mixed (MMMIXED) is the ‘classic’ maximin
strategy where Ego plays the best reply against the expectation thatAlter
is out to get him. This corresponds to Ego playing the (possibly mixed)
equilibrium in the zero-sum game that arises when the payoffs to Alter
are replaced by minus the payoffs to Ego.
Savage’s maximin-regret criterion is an interesting decision principle that
combines a ‘traditional’ decision theory (MMPURE) with a transformation
of the payoff structure. The transformed payoff structure – in the termino-
logy of Kelley and Thibaut (1978), the ‘effective matrix’ – drives decisions,
instead of just the ‘objective’ payoffs in the matrix. Savage’s decision
principle focuses on regret as a motivational force. It plays the (possibly
mixed) equilibrium strategy for the game where the payoffs Rij for Ego are
defined as Rij = Mij − maxhMhj, and the payoffs for Alter equal minus the
payoffs of Ego.1 The payoffs reflect regret in the sense that they model that
Ego feels worse when he could have had a higher payoff if he had chosen
the other move. SAVAGE can be seen as utility maximizing behavior given
that Ego assumes that the opponent is maximizing Ego’s regret.
PARETO, the symmetric Pareto-efficient solution, is a cooperative deci-
sion theory. PARETO can be seen as the decision theoretic analogue of the
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Kantian imperative: ‘act as you want others to act’ (cf. Hegselmann
1988). It assumes that the resulting behavior in any of the games is sym-
metric. That is, it assumes that Ego and Alter will both play (X, Y) with
probability (p, 1 − p). It then calculates for which p this gives the high-
est expected utility. Note that this implies that PARETO need not play
dominant strategies – it chooses to cooperate in a Prisoner’s Dilemma –
and thus ignores incentives for individual improvement. In this category,
we also include Rapoport’s NATURAL solution (Rapoport and Guyer
1966), a boundedly rational version of Nash equilibrium in the sense
that it plays pure strategy equilibria when they exist but does not allow
for mixed strategies. Whenever there exists only one symmetric equilib-
rium in pure strategies, NATURAL plays the strategy related to this equi-
librium. NATURAL plays the strategy related to the payoff dominant
equilibrium if there are three symmetric equilibria. Otherwise, NATURAL
mimics MMPURE. Finally, we added RANDOM as a decision theory that
randomizes with probability 0.5 over both alternatives.
Whereas the first and the second class of decision theories are each
other’s best reply, and the third class of theories are their own best reply,
we decided not to include the best replies to the fourth class strategies.
As we show inAppendixA, it is actually possible to construct a ‘closed’
set of strategies for our set-up such that for each decision theory its best
reply is also included. However, this would imply adding several theo-
ries (the best reply to the best reply to the best reply to SAVAGE, for
instance) that are not very appealing intuitively. Still, we have experi-
mented with adding these theories and found no results that vary sub-
stantially from the results we present. This provides some confidence
that the results are to some extent robust for variations in the set of deci-
sion theories used. In addition, because in this set-up with best replies
the most promising opponents to outperform another decision theory are
included, it is unlikely that one can develop a new theory that harms the
winners of the analyses in the paragraphs below.
Table 3 describes the behavior of each decision theory in each of the
12 types of games. The cell entries indicate the probability that a deci-
sion theory plays X in a given game (cf. Figure 1).
Almost without loss of generality we can assume that a > d. The def-
initions of the decision theories of Table 2 are incomplete in cases of
certain types of indifference between the criteria that select the choice
of alternatives. For instance, MMPURE behavior was left undefined in
the case that the security level of the two behavioral alternatives are
equal. Similarly, RISK deals only with the case of multiple strong equi-
libria. In our simulations we programmed the decision theories to play
both alternatives with probability 1/2 in case of (near) indifference. In
256 RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 21(2)
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fact, this specialized piece of code was only triggered for one game out
of hundreds of millions of games that we simulated.
3 Decision Theories Play Round Robin
In a round robin tournament, our 17 contesting decision theories play a
(large) number of symmetric 2 × 2 games with each other, and the deci-
sion theories are compared by the mean payoffs that they acquire across
all their interactions. Clearly, the ranking of the decision theories may
depend on the set of games that are being played. How should we pro-
ceed? The first possibility is the selection of a set of ‘interesting games’
by scanning the decision theoretic literature. Such an approach is still
relatively ad hoc; what is interesting scientifically need not coincide
with the kinds of games that are encountered regularly in real life.
Selecting games at random is an obvious alternative procedure. Since no
distribution of games seems of particular theoretical interest, we use a
simple procedure: the payoffs a, b, c, and d of each game are drawn
from a distribution F (and, if necessary, the payoffs are relabeled such
that a > d). All drawings within and between games are independent.
The payoffs for two competing strategies can be obtained by integration
over all possible games for a given distribution F. Instead of the tedious ana-
lytical way of calculating the scores for competing strategies, we simulated
the round robin tournament.2 We used four distributions: a uniform distribu-
tion F = U[0, 1], a standard normal distribution F = Normal(0, 1), an expo-
nential distribution, and a log-normal distribution. To eliminate noise as
much as possible, the number of randomly selected games was set at one
hundred million.3 For each of these games, we determined the decisions
made by all 17 theories; note that the decision theories may return mixed
strategies. Next, we computed for each pair of decision theories (including
the decision theories tied to them) the expected payoffs for a particular game.
Table 4 lists the average payoffs of the decision theories in the round robin
tournament. For uniformly distributed payoffs, all payoffs are in the unit
interval, so the average payoff of each decision theory is in the unit interval
as well. For the normal distribution this clearly need not hold. The winner of
the tournament, that is, the decision theory with the highest average payoff
across the simulations, is the Principle of Insufficient Reason. However, note
that PIR is the winner of the tournament by a very small margin on decision
theories such as RISK. Also observe that the ranking of the decision theories
is identical for the uniform and normal cases and only slightly different for
the log-normal and exponential distributions. It seems that, for these latter
distributions, it is profitable to be a little bit more optimistic.
258 RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 21(2)
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The average payoffs of most of the decision theories seem to be quite
close. One of the reasons is that a symmetric game with randomly gen-
erated payoffs has a dominant strategy with probability 0.5. This domi-
nant strategy is played by most of the decision theories. Nevertheless, if
we restrict the analysis to games without dominant strategies, the con-
clusions are similar. More specifically, the top 7 of the ranking remain
the same. The main change is that PARETO is moving to a higher position
especially in the cases of the uniform and the normal distribution.
To understand where the differences in rankings between the different
decision theories come from we examined (1) the average payoff of every
decision theory against every other strategy and (2) the average payoff for
every decision theory for each of the twelve types of games as indicated in
Table 1. The average payoff matrix over the one hundred million games
with payoffs drawn from a uniform distribution is listed in Table 5. For
future reference we denote this matrix by U. So U(Ti,Tj) is the expected
average payoff of decision theory Ti in interactions with decision theory Tj.
It turns out that the success of PIR (and the other non-extreme Hurwicz
strategies) is mainly due to its success against the strategies that are
designed as best replies against the Hurwicz strategies. In addition, the
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Table 4. Average payoffs and the rank orderings of 17 decision theories
in a round robin tournament of 108 randomly selected games with payoffs
(a, b, c, d) generated independently from a uniform, a standard normal,
log-normal, and exponential distribution
Decision
theory Uniform Normal Log-normal Exponential
PIR 0.64339 1 0.48741 1 2.55028 1 1.49390 1
H(0.75) 0.64056 2 0.47588 2 2.54683 2 1.49070 2
RISK 0.63844 3 0.47004 3 2.52043 4 1.47570 4
H(0.25) 0.63405 4 0.45086 4 2.51455 5 1.46583 5
MAXIMAX 0.62705 5 0.43392 5 2.53627 3 1.48085 3
PAYOFF 0.62570 6 0.42799 6 2.50873 6 1.46490 6
NATURAL 0.62092 7 0.41224 7 2.39625 8 1.41712 8
SAVAGE 0.61994 8 0.41003 8 2.43727 7 1.42171 7
BPIR 0.61879 9 0.40087 9 2.32797 10 1.38478 9
BH(0.75) 0.61622 10 0.39065 10 2.32415 11 1.38136 11
BH(0.25) 0.61587 11 0.38993 11 2.31746 13 1.37651 12
MMPURE 0.61405 12 0.38910 12 2.14307 15 1.30190 15
BMAXIMAX 0.60965 13 0.37027 13 2.31858 12 1.37623 13
BMMPURE 0.60890 14 0.36882 14 2.20543 14 1.32475 14
PARETO 0.60221 15 0.34280 15 2.35744 9 1.38470 10
MMMIXED 0.58786 16 0.29620 16 1.93807 16 1.19876 16
RANDOM 0.50891 17 0.03020 17 1.74638 17 1.04985 17
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Hurwicz strategies are doing pretty well among each other and also against
the third and fourth class of strategies. For instance, PIR is a best reply
against RISK and performs just as well as RISK against PAYOFF. MAXIMAX is
a best reply against PAYOFF. The best replies against the various Hurwicz
strategies lose the battle because their average payoff against each other is
low. PAYOFF and RISK are doing well over the whole range of opponents,
although PAYOFF loses against the more pessimistic strategies such as
MMPURE and best replies against these pessimistic strategies as well. In
general, we can conclude that being too pessimistic is not profitable in this
population of strategies. Being too optimistic is also harmful, but not as bad
as being too pessimistic. One could wonder what the optimal α for opti-
mism would be in this population of decision theories, but this question is
not that interesting given the subsequent analyses. Below we will learn that
the Hurwicz strategies are not likely to survive RISK in the long run if other
decision theories against which they perform well disappear and that there
does not exist an optimal α to outperform RISK.
A deeper insight into the causes of these results is obtained by studying
the results for the twelve types of games separately. First, as mentioned
before, it should be noted that most decision theories play the dominant
strategy if such a strategy is available. Only RANDOM and sometimes
PARETO do not play the dominant strategy. Consequently, there is hardly
any differentiation between decision theories in the six types of games for
which there is a dominant strategy. PIR is better than or at least as good as
all the other strategies for all other types of games except one in which PIR
is outperformed by H(0.75) with a margin of less than 0.1%. The relatively
low positions of PAYOFF, NATURAL, and PARETO are mainly due to their low
scores in the games in which a is the highest and c is the lowest payoff,
that is, the Assurance game and one of the Assurance-like games. In addi-
tion, the position of PARETO is especially low because of a large loss in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma in which the others are defecting. RISK and PAYOFF
both lose against PIR in the games with three Nash equilibria from which
only one is symmetric, for instance in the Chicken game.
4 The Evolution of Rationality
The round robin tournament gives a first impression of which kinds of
strategies tend to perform best. However, one of the typical problems
with such a tournament is the lack of robustness with respect to the inclu-
sion of more or less well-performing decision theories such as random
(erratic) choice, or other strategies that typically tend to perform poorly
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(Binmore 1995: 198–201). Axelrod (1984) has rightly stressed that if
successful types of behavior tend to grow in a population at the expense
of unsuccessful types of behavior, behavior that is successful in the long
run should depend for its success on other successful types of behavior.
Types of behavior that thrive mainly because they are successful against
types of behavior that are themselves unsuccessful, will likely become
extinct in the medium time range: After the initially unsuccessful types
of behavior have disappeared from the population, types of behavior that
depended for their success on the now extinct types will likely disappear
next. Thus, in the long run, success depends on success against other suc-
cessful types rather than on exploitation of unsuccessful types.
Before turning to such an evolutionary analysis, we first consider a
simple two-stage game with two players. In stage 1, the players inde-
pendently decide to adopt one of the 17 decision theories. In stage 2,
Nature selects a random game as described in the previous section, and
the players use their selected decision theory to make a decision. How
would a rational player select a decision theory in this two-stage game?
Obviously, if player i uses decision theory Ti, the expected payoff of
player 1 is U(T1,T2) and of player 2 is U(T2,T1).
Table 6 describes the symmetric Nash equilibria of the two-stage game
for the four probability distributions, computed using Gambit (McKelvey
et al. 2005). At first sight it may seem odd to allow players to choose
between decision theories in stage 1, and afterwards compute the equi-
libria strictly based on one decision theory, in particular, Nash. The main
reason is that the set-up we developed can be considered as a larger one-
shot game in which the 17 decision theories are the available strategies
and the matrix U is the payoff matrix. Therefore, the Nash equilibria of
this larger game are precisely the candidates for survival in an evolution-
ary context. Given that only strategies that are part of a symmetric Nash
equilibrium in symmetric games can be evolutionarily stable (Weibull
1995: chapter 2), we restrict ourselves to the symmetric equilibria in this
two-stage game (for the different distributions F the Gambit analyses
produced between 50 and 70 asymmetric equilibria). We find 7 symmet-
ric Nash equilibria for the uniform, exponential and normal distribution,
and 5 for the log-normal distribution. Obviously, we find two pure sym-
metric Nash equilibria. By definition, a best reply against RISK is RISK,
while a best reply to PAYOFF is PAYOFF itself. In addition, we find a num-
ber of mixed equilibria. First, for all four probability distributions F, we
find that H(0.25) and BH(0.25) form a mixed equilibrium, with somewhat
different mixing probabilities for different F. The same holds for H(0.75)
and BH(0.75), with the exception that this last equilibrium does not occur
262 RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 21(2)
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under the log-normal distribution. There are some other equilibria that
are mixtures of the equilibria mentioned above in which occasionally
PIR and NATURAL are included.
We further specify in the rows labeled ‘Attraction’which equilibria of the
ones listed in Table 6 are more appealing from an evolutionary perspective.
It is easy to show that the two pure equilibria are evolutionarily stable.
Although there exist alternative best reply strategies against them, these
strategies are doing worse against themselves. The equilibria that are mix-
tures with RISK or PAYOFF are not evolutionarily stable strategies. This fol-
lows from the theorem that if an evolutionarily stable strategy has support
on a given set of pure strategies, then any strategy with support on a subset
of this given set cannot be a Nash equilibrium strategy (Weibull 1995: 41,
proposition 2.2). Therefore, the combinations of H(0.25) and H(0.75) with
their best replies are the only other potential candidates of evolutionarily
stable strategies. Because PIR only occurs in combination with PAYOFF
and/or RISK, it will not survive in an evolutionary context. So nowwe inves-
tigate the relative importance of the various (potential) evolutionarily stable
strategies. The central element of a dynamic analysis of the composition of
a population of decision theories is a feedback mechanism between the
payoff of decision theories and their share π in the population. We focus
on a biological model that interprets average payoff of a decision theory as
fitness. The fitness of a decision theory is proportional to the probability of
getting ‘offspring’ of the decision theory. Assuming that the total size of
the population is fixed, the share πi of decision theory i in the population
increases if and only if the payoff (U π)i of i is larger than the average
payoff π′Uπ in the population (see Hofbauer and Sigmund 1988: 108–137).
In continuous time, this common evolutionary model, known as the repli-
cator dynamics, can be described by the differential equation
dπi(t)
——— = ρπi(t) ((Uπ (t))i − π(t)′Uπ(t)) for i = 1,...,17.dt
Deriving analytical solutions of these differential equations is neither
feasible nor very informative. Therefore, numerical solutions were com-
puted in Matlab using the second and third order Runge-Kutta method.
In Figure 2 we display these solutions for two initial distributions of the
17 decision theories for the payoff matrix U that is associated with uni-
formly distributed payoffs of 2 × 2 games. In the left panel, the initial
population consists of equal shares of the 17 decision theories. As we see
in the graph, there are three types of time-paths for decision theories:4
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• The proportion in the population of RANDOM, BH(0.25), MMPURE,
BMMPURE, MMMIXED, BMAXIMAX, and PARETO monotonically
decrease to zero.
• The proportion of MAXIMAX, PIR, BPIR, H(0.25), H(0.75), BH(0.75),
SAVAGE, PAYOFF, and NATURAL increases in the initial phase of the
population dynamics, and then decreases to zero.
• The proportion of RISK increases monotonically to fixation.
The above division of decision theories corresponds with the lower and
higher performing theories in the round robin tournament. This is under-
standable because in the round robin tournament all decision theories
also have the same number of representatives. Only after some time, it
becomes more important that a decision theory does well against other
well-performing strategies. For this, the results of the round robin tour-
nament are not very informative anymore. After 100 time units, the pop-
ulation consists of 15% PIR, 6% BPIR, and 79% RISK. By tracing the
time-paths for longer periods, we found that RISK does indeed occupy
the whole population in the long run (fixation).
In the right panel of Figure 2 we consider the same dynamics from an
initial population that consists of 99% RANDOM with the remainder 1%
shared equally among the remaining 16 decision theories. Qualitatively,
the time-paths of the decision theories are very similar, after a first phase
in which RANDOM behavior is being wiped out. Most of the decision the-
ories die out quickly. At time 120, only three decision theories have sur-
vived in a non-negligible proportion in approximately the same shares
as in the first case.


























Figure 2. Population dynamics of the 17 decision theories. In the left graph,
the initial distribution consists of all 17 decision theories in equal shares.
In the right graph, RANDOM occupies 99% of the initial distribution
with the remaining 1% equally shared by the other 16 decision theories.
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We have indicated above that there are multiple Nash equilibria that
could possibly be evolutionarily stable. Stability, however, is a local
property, meaning that if the distribution is ‘close enough,’ the system
converges to the stable state. To get a better understanding of the impor-
tance of the different equilibria, we therefore calculated the equilibrium
to which the population converges for 5000 randomly chosen starting
values, separately for each of the four probability distributions for
payoffs that we use in this study. Table 6 lists the proportion of times
(multiplied by 1000) that the process converged to each of the Nash
equilibria, which can be interpreted as the sizes of the basins of attrac-
tion of these equilibria. As we mentioned earlier, if an equilibrium is sta-
ble, it cannot be part of a stable equilibrium with additional decision
theories. This explains why we never observed convergence to the last
three equilibria in case of the uniform, exponential, and normal distrib-
ution, and the last two in case of the log-normal distribution. We do
observe convergence to the equilibria that are mixtures of H(0.25) and
BH(0.25) and of H(0.75) and BH(0.75). These equilibria have rather
small basins of attraction, at most 5% in all cases considered. The big
attraction zones are for the Nash decision theories, especially for RISK.
For the uniform and the normal distribution, in 95% of the cases start-
ing from a random initial distribution, we end up in RISK. RISK is also
doing very well with the other two probability distributions, but here
PAYOFF has a basis of attraction of 14–17%. We do not have an explana-
tion for this difference between probability distributions. Overall, how-
ever, RISK is the clear ‘dominant’ decision theory from the evolutionary
perspective in the sense that starting from some mixture of the 17 deci-
sion strategies, it is by far the most likely to emerge in the end.
A last worry that we address related to the evolutionary stability of
RISK and PAYOFF is whether one can design an 18th decision theory that
might invade a population that consists of one type of actors, either
RISK or PAYOFF. Such a decision theory should have two properties:
first, it should be a best reply against RISK or PAYOFF. Second, it should
perform better against itself than RISK or PAYOFF perform against this
new decision theory (see Weibull 1995: 37). This implies that such a
decision theory should copy RISK or PAYOFF in all games (see Table 3)
in which RISK and PAYOFF play a pure strategy. Only in the games with
one symmetric equilibrium that is a mixed equilibrium, such a new
decision theory can choose whatever it wants still being a best reply
against RISK and PAYOFF. However, in Theorem 2 in Appendix B, we
show that it is impossible to choose behavior in these games in such a
way that RISK or PAYOFF can be invaded.
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5 Dealing with Humans
In the previous sections, we studied symmetric interactions between 17
decision theories.We now confront these decision theories with the way in
which human subjects choose between alternatives in symmetric 2 × 2
games in an experimental setting. The data were collected via booklets dis-
tributed as leave-behinds after a national household survey in the
Netherlands (HIN) in 1995. Two booklets were left behind with each
household. The booklets consisted of fourteen pages with various (abstract
and scenario-like) experiments on interpersonal decision making. Three
pages of this booklet described abstract 2 × 2 games, presented as ‘color
games’ in which the respondent had to imagine that he or she was playing
with an unknown other respondent of the survey. Both participants had to
choose between the colors red and green, without knowing the other par-
ticipant’s choice, with monetary outcomes depending on both participants’
choices. Thirty-two versions of the booklets with different experimental
conditions (outcomes) were produced; subjects received a randomly
selected version. Out of a total of 32 × 3 = 96 color games, we use the 48
color games that were symmetric 2 × 2 games (the other 48 color games
were asymmetric 2 × 2 games). The outcomes used in the symmetric 2 × 2
are (0,2,6,10), (0,2,8,10), (0,4,6,10) and (0,4,8,10). These four outcomes
were crossed with the 12 types of symmetric games.
For instance, we used four symmetric Prisoner’s Dilemmas (see
Table 7), four variants of Chicken Games, 4 variants of Assurance
Games, etc. Respondents were requested to fill out the booklets individ-
ually, stressing that there were no right or wrong answers. A recall was
sent if the booklet was not returned within two weeks. After the comple-
tion of the data collection, six lucky participants were randomly chosen.
They received a prize of 1 000 Dutch guilders (= Euro 450 = $ 500) and
the winners were announced in a national newspaper on a prescheduled
date. The whole procedure was made clear in the booklet. Ultimately,
2 283 of 3 354 (68%) booklets were returned, with only small differences
in the participation rates in terms of gender, age, education, religiosity,
and political preference (see Bruins and Weesie 1996: section 1.6 for
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Table 7. Payoffs in the Prisoner’s Dilemmas
red green red green red green red green
red 6 0 8 0 6 0 8 0
green 10 2 10 2 10 4 10 4
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details). Partial non-response on the color games was 1.6%. Since the
subjects filled out the booklets without supervision, we were obviously
concerned whether subjects had worked seriously and individually. Six
booklets were marked as suspicious because we had some doubts as to
whether subjects had worked seriously in at least part of the booklet. By
comparing handwriting in the booklets received from households, we
identified two pairs of booklets that we thought were filled out by the
same person; these four booklets were marked as suspicious as well.
With these data it is possible to compare how our 17 strategies would
fare if they were matched against the population of individuals who
filled out the booklets. Table 8 shows the results of this comparison. We
show results for all 48 games together, for the games with a dominant
strategy excluding the Prisoner’s Dilemma, for the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
for Assurance-like games, and for Chicken-like games. Besides the 17
strategies, we also include the ‘decision theory’ of the humans them-
selves (HUMAN in Table 8).
Let us first consider the columns in Table 8 that refer to games with a
dominant strategy (excluding the Prisoner’s Dilemma) and the Prisoner’s
Dilemma. In these columns we see that there is hardly any difference
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Table 8. Total payoffs of decision theories against human behavior in
48 symmetric 2 × 2 games from the HIN-data. Payoffs are
normalized so that the smallest payoff is 0, the largest is 1.
The maximum score across all games is therefore 48
Decision Dominant Prisoner’s Assurance- Chicken-
theory All strategy* dilemma like like
H(0.75), MAXIMAX 36.43 17.43 2.42 9.53 7.05
PAYOFF 36.09 17.43 2.42 9.53 6.72
BH(0.75), BMAXIMAX 36.01 17.43 2.42 9.53 6.63
BPIR 35.84 17.43 2.42 8.90 7.09
BH(0.25), BMMPURE 35.50 17.43 2.42 7.82 7.83
PIR 35.34 17.43 2.42 8.90 6.59
RISK 35.23 17.43 2.42 8.67 6.72
NATURAL 35.22 17.43 2.42 9.53 5.86
PARETO 34.58 17.39 1.22 9.53 6.44
SAVAGE 34.32 17.43 2.42 7.77 6.72
HUMAN 33.58 16.54 1.93 8.76 6.35
H(0.25), MMPURE 33.52 17.43 2.42 7.82 5.86
MMMIXED 32.65 17.43 2.42 6.41 6.40
RANDOM 26.81 11.22 1.82 6.93 6.84
*I.e., the dominant strategy games excluding the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
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between the strategies, as one could have anticipated, given that most of
the 17 strategies choose to play the dominant strategy. The decision the-
ory that suffers the most is PARETO. The main differences between strate-
gies are found in the Assurance-like games and the Chicken-like games.
We see that, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, relatively optimistic strate-
gies tend to perform well. MAXIMAX, H(0.75), BH(0.75), and BMAXIMAX
all perform well. That is, it pays to be optimistic about what humans will
play in symmetric 2 × 2 games (MAXIMAX and H(0.75)), and it also pays
to have an optimistic view about the strategies others are using and then
play best reply against it (BH(0.75) and BMAXIMAX). Finally, the standard
game-theoretic solution PAYOFF also ranks high.
When we restrict ourselves to behavior in Chicken-like games, we see
that the best reply against humans seems to be to assume that others are
playing MMPURE, and play a best reply against that. The situation is less
clear for Assurance games; many decision theories seem to work
(including NATURAL and PARETO).5
All in all, we can conclude that the differences in games without a dom-
inant strategy drive the results and that PAYOFF and the relatively optimistic
strategies tend to perform well against humans. Humans do not perform
very well against themselves in our set-up. They tend to rank among the
strategies with the lowest scores. Of course, it does not follow from this
that humans are actually not very well able to deal with strangers. Our set-
up is rather specific and the distribution of games in the real world might
be quite different from the distribution analyzed here. In addition, the
‘human’ decision theory is not one decision theory. Some people apply
different strategies than others and in this analysis we just assume the
average behavior of humans per game to be the human decision theory.
We now compare the strategies to human behavior, to find out which
of the strategies resembles average human behavior of respondents in
Dutch households the most. For each game in the data we can derive the
choice of each decision theory, and compare it to actual behavior in the
data. We then calculate a difference-score as the absolute difference
between the actual choice by the human and the prediction of the deci-
sion theory, and average this difference across individuals. The results
are displayed in Table 9.6
We find that NATURAL is the decision theory that resembles human
behavior in the data best. The differences between decision theories mostly
arise in games without dominant strategies. PAYOFF, PARETO, MAXIMAX,
and BMAXIMAX perform similarly well in the Assurance-like games, but
NATURAL gains momentum in the Chicken-like games.Apparently, precisely
in these kinds of games humans and NATURAL tend to follow a maximin
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strategy. A bootstrap analysis suggests that differences between theories of
about 0.026 are statistically significant (at 95%). Combining these findings
with the findings from Table 8, it is logical that the best reply against
NATURAL – a decision theory that we did not included in our original set –
would have been the best reply against the humans in the data. And indeed,
BNATURAL scored 37.21 against humans, outperforming every other decision
theory in our theory set.
6 Conclusions and Discussion
We analyzed the relative performance of formal decision theories for one-
shot symmetric 2 × 2 games, both in simulated interactions among the for-
mal decision theories and between the theories and observed human
behavior. It is hard to tell from looking at the winner of our round robin
tournament of decision theories, PIR, but in general it seems that in such
a tournament it pays if a decision theory is relatively optimistic, or at least
not pessimistic. In an evolutionary analysis RISK mostly gets the upper
hand eventually: virtually all simulations converge to a population of deci-
sion theories consisting of RISK only. In addition, we have shown that RISK
as well as PAYOFF cannot be invaded by any other decision theory includ-
ing decision theories that are not in our set of theories. In this sense, our
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Table 9. Difference of decision theories with human behavior in 48
symmetric 2 × 2 games from the HIN data. Lower scores
represent lower difference and thus higher resemblance
Decision Dominant Prisoner’s Assurance- Chicken-
theory All strategy dilemma like like
NATURAL 0.184 0.074 0.430 0.217 0.252
PAYOFF 0.229 0.074 0.430 0.217 0.435
PARETO 0.231 0.079 0.570 0.217 0.386
PIR 0.239 0.074 0.430 0.346 0.348
BH(0.75), BMAXIMAX 0.246 0.074 0.430 0.217 0.504
H(0.25), MMPURE 0.249 0.074 0.430 0.488 0.252
H(0.75), MAXIMAX 0.249 0.074 0.430 0.217 0.496
RISK 0.260 0.074 0.430 0.346 0.435
SAVAGE 0.281 0.074 0.430 0.431 0.435
MMMIXED 0.311 0.074 0.430 0.595 0.398
BPIR 0.314 0.074 0.430 0.346 0.652
BH(0.25), BMMPURE 0.372 0.074 0.430 0.488 0.748
RANDOM 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
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work can be conceived as providing additional arguments in favor of the
idea that in the long run evolutionary forces tend to favor (game-theoretic)
rationality in a world of symmetric 2 × 2 games. Or, more broadly speak-
ing, our findings support that when dealing with strangers (i.e., in one-
shot interaction) rational behavior might evolve in the long run.
When we compare the behavior of the decision strategies against
humans in one-shot 2 × 2 games, we find that both PAYOFF and the
relatively optimistic strategies tend to perform well against humans.
Surprisingly, humans themselves tend to perform relatively poorly against
themselves. This could be conceived as support for the claim that
humans do not have a very adequate view of the ‘average behavior’ they
are likely to encounter in the population (or, that they have an adequate
view of the population, but do not know how, or do not want, to take
advantage of it). When we look at this more closely, we find that human
behavior resembles NATURAL the most. The best reply against NATURAL
is in fact the decision theory that promises the highest revenue when pit-
ted against a population of humans, or at least a population of respon-
dents of Dutch households. When we relate this to the findings as
mentioned in the previous paragraph, it seems that even though there is
hope that rational behavior in one-shot 2 × 2 encounters will occur in the
long run, our data do not support that humans use rational expectations.
Of course, this claim should not be interpreted too strongly because we
assume a specific distribution of games in our experiment, which might
not correspond with the distribution of interactions that humans have in
real life. In addition, we consider humans as a homogeneous group and
we did not go into differences between different types of humans that
might use different strategies.
An interesting extension of our analyses would be to analyze larger
classes of games. A logical follow-up would be the asymmetric 2 × 2
games, because it would enable us to distinguish between strategies bet-
ter. A main advantage is that most decision theories apply to asymmet-
ric games as well. The only exceptions are PARETO (Pareto-optimal play
is in general not unique in asymmetric games), and PAYOFF (the equilib-
ria of 2 × 2 games are generally not ordered via payoff-dominance, so
equilibrium selection does not work here). Since both these decision
theories did not perform very well for symmetric 2 × 2 games, we would
not expect that dropping them from the analysis changes our conclu-
sions significantly. Or, it is possible to modify PARETO in asymmetric
games in such a way that a Pareto-efficient strategy vector is selected by
cooperative Nash bargaining with MMMIXED or another solution con-
cept as the status quo. Empirically, such data are available both in the
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HIN-data we used here, but also in Frenkel (1976; reported in Rapoport
et al. 1976). Frenkel collected a large amount of data on subject’s
choices in a variety of asymmetric 2 × 2 games. It is therefore feasible
to perform an analysis for asymmetric 2 × 2 games in a similar fashion:
comprising both interaction between the formal theories and interaction
between the formal theories and human subjects.
The evolutionary analysis of the emergence of rationality that we
have presented here is incomplete in at least one respect: the set of com-
peting types (decision theories) are explicitly defined as inputs in the
evolutionary analysis. This type of analysis is also referred to as an ‘eco-
logical analysis’ focusing only on selection, rather than an ‘evolutionary
analysis’ that encompasses selection and creation of new types. That is,
rationality is not being created in the evolutionary process, we have to
include some rationality (although only a little bit) to make rationality
flourish in the long run. However, a more elaborate analysis would be
possible using genetic algorithms on a suitably defined set of functions
from the payoffs of symmetric 2 × 2 games into the set of decisions.
Since payoffs are cardinal entities, this only involves a (subset of the) set
of functions f: R2 → [0,1]. Alternatively, a coding of such functions that
seems to lend itself well to applying the genetic algorithms involves
LISP-like symbolic expressions (Koza 1992). It would certainly add to
our analyses when it can be shown that a genetic algorithm will generate
(close approximations to) the long-term survivor theories such as equi-
librium selection via risk dominance. It is probably not that difficult to
generalize such an analysis to more general games. We hope to report on
such an analysis in a future article.
Appendix A – A Note on Best Replies
We defined a best reply informally as the decision theory that always plays
a best answer to a given other decision theory. This does not give a unique
description of a strategy in every interaction, since if a decision theory plays
a mixed strategy that leaves the partner indifferent, the best reply can be any
pure or mixed strategy. More formally, we define best reply as follows.
Let T be a decision theory defined on one-shot symmetric 2 × 2 games
with four different payoffs. Let bT be the best reply against T.
• If Alter’s choice based on T does not leave Ego indifferent, Ego
applying bT chooses the move that maximizes his outcome given that
Alter uses T.
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• If Alter’s choice based on T leaves Ego indifferent, Ego applying bT
chooses the move that is in Nash equilibrium with the move of Alter.
The second part of the definition ensures a unique definition because (1)
given a move prescribed by T, there is at most one possible strategy by
Ego that forms a Nash equilibrium with the move prescribed by T, and
(2) if the move prescribed by T makes Ego indifferent between the two
pure strategies, this implies T prescribes randomization and, therefore,
bT prescribes the corresponding randomization that leaves Alter indif-
ferent as well. In the last situation, the strategies are thus in equilibrium.
Theorem 1. For two theories T1 and T2 defined on a set of games Γ, we say
that T1=T2 if T1 and T2 prescribe the same behavior for all games in Γ. For
any given decision theory T defined on one-shot symmetric 2 × 2 games,
there are three possibilities:
1. T = bT,
2. T = bbT, or
3. bT = bbbT.
The set of decision theories for which the first equality holds is a subset
of the set of decision theories for which the second equality holds. The
third equality holds for all decision theories.
Proof. If T prescribes symmetric Nash equilibrium behavior, we are
in case 1: the best reply to T is T itself.
If T always prescribes a strategy for which there is a best reply that con-
stitutes a Nash equilibrium in combination with the strategy prescribed by
T, the best reply will by definition prescribe the other part of the Nash
equilibrium. Therefore, bbT again prescribes the same behavior as T.
Assume that we have a decision theory T that belongs not to case 1 or 2.
Then, T prescribes behavior that is not part of an equilibrium combination
of strategies for some 2 × 2 games. There is always a unique best reply in
pure strategies in such a game, because if T prescribes behavior that
makes the partner indifferent, there is always a reply that is in equilibrium
with T. In symmetric 2 × 2 games with unequal payoffs, both players
either have a dominant strategy or both pure strategies are part of an equi-
librium combination. Thus, bT always plays a part of an equilibrium com-
bination of strategies. This implies that the best reply of T fulfills case 2,
and therefore, bT = bbbT. Clearly, T = bT implies bbT = bT = T and the
conditions for case 2 both imply bT = bbbT.
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Corollary 1. BBH(Α) = H(Α) in symmetric 2 × 2 games.
The argument is that the Hurwicz decision theories always prescribe a
pure strategy and they play the dominant strategy if it exists. Therefore,
they belong to case 2 above.
For the other decision theories, we do not provide formal proofs, but
it can be derived that PIR and BPIR are also best replies (in the informal
sense, i.e. that not necessarily the condition on playing a Nash equilib-
rium in case of randomization is fulfilled) against SAVAGE and RISK.
MAXIMAX is the best reply against PARETO and in the informal sense also
against PAYOFF. BMAXIMAX is also in the informal sense a best reply
against PAYOFF. PAYOFF and RISK are their own best replies. Using this
logic of best replies we see that not all best replies to the decision theo-
ries we chose are in our set of theories; i.e. our set of decision theories
is not ‘closed’ and in principle vulnerable to the addition of these best
reply decision theories. The two strategies for which we did not include
a best reply are MMMIXED and NATURAL. The best reply to the best reply
of MMMIXED is also not in our experiment. From the theorem it follows
that the ‘triple’ best reply of MMMIXED is the same as the best reply of
MMMIXED. Because NATURAL always plays a pure strategy and it plays
the dominant strategy if it exists, BBNATURAL is NATURAL itself. Finally,
the best reply against SAVAGE in the strict sense is also not included.
Appendix B – The Impossibility to Invade Risk and Payoff
Although RISK and PAYOFF are their own best replies, this does not imply
that there cannot be other decision theories that can invade them in an
evolutionary process. Now we state the formal theorem on the impossi-
bility to invade RISK and PAYOFF.
Theorem 2. For any decision theory T, it is impossible to invade a pop-
ulation that consists completely of actors using either RISK or PAYOFF.
Proof. If T would like to invade RISK or PAYOFF, it has to fulfill two
conditions. First, it has to be a best reply against RISK or PAYOFF and,
second, it has to perform better against itself, than RISK or PAYOFF
performs against this new decision theory (see Weibull 1995: 37). This
already implies that the new decision theory copies RISK or PAYOFF in all
games in which those theories do not randomize and, therefore, the best
reply is uniquely determined. Only in the games in which RISK and
PAYOFF randomize, the new decision theory can choose a probability to
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fulfill the second condition. We know that RISK and PAYOFF randomize
in these games with probability . Assume the new
decision theorem randomizes with probability r0. Then, the second
condition implies that
r0
2a + (1 − r0)2d + r0(1 − r0) (b + c) > r0r1a + (1 − r0) (1 − r1)d +
r0(1 − r1)b + (1 − r0) r1c,
which is equivalent to
r0(r0 − r1)a − (1 − r0) (r0 − r1)d − r0(r0 − r1)b + (1 − r0) (r0 − r1) c > 0,
Now, we need to distinguish two cases: r0 > r1 and r0 < r1. Assume
r0 > r1, then the equation above is equivalent to r0a − (1 − r0)d − r0b +
(1 − r0) c > 0 or, because a − b − c + d < 0 in all the relevant games,
. This contradicts the assumption. Similarly, the
assumption r0 < r1 leads to a contradiction. Therefore, there does not
exist an r0 that would allow an invasion of RISK or PAYOFF.
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NOTES
1. A whole family of decision theories can actually be constructed by combining some
kind of transformation from a given into an effective matrix with one of the decision
principles. For instance, one could combine equilibrium selection via payoff dominance
with a value transformation in which the utility of an actor is assumed to depend on the
outcomes to self and to the other actor (altruism, envy, etc.).
2. This is equivalent to numerical integration across the possible games.
3. For the uniform distribution, we compared the simulated results with the analytical




= r1a − b − c + d
r1 =
d − c
a − b − c + d
WEESIE ET AL.: THE RATIONALE OF RATIONALITY 275
 at University of Groningen on January 19, 2011rss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
4. From other starting values other time-paths are possible. For instance, decision theo-
ries may alternate a few times between becoming more and less frequent, before
finally decreasing to 0.
5. Robustness of the results in Table 8 was analyzed by bootstrapping. This gives some
mixed results. When we choose to bootstrap across the 48 games we get 95% confi-
dence intervals that run from about 2.5 above and below the presented values. This
implies that the confidence intervals from the best and the worst decision theory
(excluding RANDOM) overlap. However, bootstrapping at the respondent level gives
confidence intervals of about 0.5.
6. When dealing with a decision theory that prescribes mixed strategies, we do the fol-
lowing. Suppose that we have a decision theory that prescribes that the probability to
choose a certain alternative equals 0.4 and we have an individual that indeed chooses
this alternative. In this case the difference score is taken to be |0.4 − 1| = 0.6.
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